Drew Martin and Jon Miller exchange ideas on how to overcome barriers to nuclear disarmament.
Drew: For nearly 70 years nuclear weapons have persisted as an ongoing part of international affairs. During this time, there have been countless shifts to the international environment, yet nuclear weapons have remained a salient feature. What obstacles make disarmament a challenge and how can they be addressed?
Jon: I think domestic politics is maybe the biggest barrier. In the U.S. for example, cutting defense spending is usually accompanied by a narrative that focuses on how America is being made weaker (this despite the fact that even without nuclear weapons America's defense spending would far outstrip any other nation's). But I also think that nuclear weapons are a much bigger issue domestically in other nations: in Iran, the nuclear program has become a source of national pride because of Washington's and Israel's efforts to stop it; Russians view their nuclear arsenal as a primary source of international legitimacy. I think that if people were more aware of the dangers that nuclear weapons pose, the weapons might lose a lot of domestic clout.
Drew: Domestic concerns are extremely important in understanding disarmament. It is interesting how no one in the US seems to ponder the fact that US defense is unintentionally subsidized by geography. How many other countries are blessed with two free, ocean-sized moats?
Another concern highlighted by domestic politics is the problem of decommissioning. This is is basically a "not in my backyard" problem. For disarmament to happen nuclear material will have to be stored in secured locations. For this to occur, there will have to be an element of public diplomacy in explaining the benefits of decommissioning weapons. I would recommend storage sites to be located on former weapon sites since these are already secured and continuing the use of the site would not abruptly pull funds out of a community.
Jon: While I agree that storing the materials from decommissioned nuclear weapons would certainly be a challenge, the necessary step prior to storage would have to be verification of disarmament. Setting aside all the political hurdles, global total disarmament requires some sort of international body to verify that countries are actually disarming. The IAEA seems like a logical choice, but this may be a hurdle for non-NPT countries like North Korea.
Drew: Verification could be a source of challenge but it could also be a source of opportunity. I think that countries such as North Korea and Iran would consent to a new verification regime if it lead to improved relationships with the US. Neither of these countries have formal relationships with the US and a verification deal could be sweetened by extending diplomatic recognition and the array of economic, security and cultural benefits that come from bilateral relations.
A second way for a verification system to work would be to have a great power interlocutor. Since countries such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and India do not have strong verification systems such as satellites (although India is catching up), China and Russia could fill this void. In theory, these great powers would observe disarmament on behalf of newer nuclear participants while all parties disarmed.
Jon: I'm not entirely sure I agree about the first point. Iran has tried to create a mutually beneficial relationship with the US, making one overture after the other, particularly in the last two decades. But Washington has refused almost all of the gestures. This is part of the reason why Iran gets so frustrated when the US claims that Iran is staunch in its unwillingness to negotiate; there are even instances in the past in which Iran has offered the exact measures (with regards to its nuclear program) that the US now demands, yet were rebuffed. Moreover, the US violates Iran's sovereignty daily in ways that would be decried as acts of war if Iran were to use them against the US. Unfortunately, I don't see too much hope in bilateral negotiations.
I agree with your second point, but I'd take it even further. Disarmament is going to require a great powers-led coalition of some sort, of both nuclear and non-nuclear, and not purely Western, nations that enforce disarmament. Too many nations view the UN as a Western puppet for global nuclear disarmament to fall under its umbrella. Disarmament is going to require global consensus and action.
Drew: A disarmament coalition sounds superb, but it will be contingent on US participation. All matters relating to the bomb eventually come back to Washington. Russia won't reduce its weapons without US reduction and China has similar concerns. However, a more pressing matter is how representatives and civil society in the US can reignite the discourse on nuclear weapons. I think it is extremely ironic that the lack of nuclear weapons actually used in combat since 1945 has indirectly perpetuated their existence. While it is good that nuclear weapons were never used for a third time, this fact, combined with the short-term nature of human memory have allowed nuclear weapons to languish in a state of limbo.
Jon: I agree that nukes have fallen far from being main headlines, though there are still plenty of people who are worried about loose nukes after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, or work to prevent nuclear terrorism. The difference is that those efforts are not about disarmament, but about making sure weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. What doesn’t seem to be understood is that global disarmament solves this problem: no nuclear weapons anywhere means no nuclear weapons in the wrong hands.
Drew: For nearly 70 years nuclear weapons have persisted as an ongoing part of international affairs. During this time, there have been countless shifts to the international environment, yet nuclear weapons have remained a salient feature. What obstacles make disarmament a challenge and how can they be addressed?
Jon: I think domestic politics is maybe the biggest barrier. In the U.S. for example, cutting defense spending is usually accompanied by a narrative that focuses on how America is being made weaker (this despite the fact that even without nuclear weapons America's defense spending would far outstrip any other nation's). But I also think that nuclear weapons are a much bigger issue domestically in other nations: in Iran, the nuclear program has become a source of national pride because of Washington's and Israel's efforts to stop it; Russians view their nuclear arsenal as a primary source of international legitimacy. I think that if people were more aware of the dangers that nuclear weapons pose, the weapons might lose a lot of domestic clout.
Drew: Domestic concerns are extremely important in understanding disarmament. It is interesting how no one in the US seems to ponder the fact that US defense is unintentionally subsidized by geography. How many other countries are blessed with two free, ocean-sized moats?
Another concern highlighted by domestic politics is the problem of decommissioning. This is is basically a "not in my backyard" problem. For disarmament to happen nuclear material will have to be stored in secured locations. For this to occur, there will have to be an element of public diplomacy in explaining the benefits of decommissioning weapons. I would recommend storage sites to be located on former weapon sites since these are already secured and continuing the use of the site would not abruptly pull funds out of a community.
Jon: While I agree that storing the materials from decommissioned nuclear weapons would certainly be a challenge, the necessary step prior to storage would have to be verification of disarmament. Setting aside all the political hurdles, global total disarmament requires some sort of international body to verify that countries are actually disarming. The IAEA seems like a logical choice, but this may be a hurdle for non-NPT countries like North Korea.
Drew: Verification could be a source of challenge but it could also be a source of opportunity. I think that countries such as North Korea and Iran would consent to a new verification regime if it lead to improved relationships with the US. Neither of these countries have formal relationships with the US and a verification deal could be sweetened by extending diplomatic recognition and the array of economic, security and cultural benefits that come from bilateral relations.
A second way for a verification system to work would be to have a great power interlocutor. Since countries such as North Korea, Iran, Pakistan and India do not have strong verification systems such as satellites (although India is catching up), China and Russia could fill this void. In theory, these great powers would observe disarmament on behalf of newer nuclear participants while all parties disarmed.
Jon: I'm not entirely sure I agree about the first point. Iran has tried to create a mutually beneficial relationship with the US, making one overture after the other, particularly in the last two decades. But Washington has refused almost all of the gestures. This is part of the reason why Iran gets so frustrated when the US claims that Iran is staunch in its unwillingness to negotiate; there are even instances in the past in which Iran has offered the exact measures (with regards to its nuclear program) that the US now demands, yet were rebuffed. Moreover, the US violates Iran's sovereignty daily in ways that would be decried as acts of war if Iran were to use them against the US. Unfortunately, I don't see too much hope in bilateral negotiations.
I agree with your second point, but I'd take it even further. Disarmament is going to require a great powers-led coalition of some sort, of both nuclear and non-nuclear, and not purely Western, nations that enforce disarmament. Too many nations view the UN as a Western puppet for global nuclear disarmament to fall under its umbrella. Disarmament is going to require global consensus and action.
Drew: A disarmament coalition sounds superb, but it will be contingent on US participation. All matters relating to the bomb eventually come back to Washington. Russia won't reduce its weapons without US reduction and China has similar concerns. However, a more pressing matter is how representatives and civil society in the US can reignite the discourse on nuclear weapons. I think it is extremely ironic that the lack of nuclear weapons actually used in combat since 1945 has indirectly perpetuated their existence. While it is good that nuclear weapons were never used for a third time, this fact, combined with the short-term nature of human memory have allowed nuclear weapons to languish in a state of limbo.
Jon: I agree that nukes have fallen far from being main headlines, though there are still plenty of people who are worried about loose nukes after the collapse of the Soviet Union, for example, or work to prevent nuclear terrorism. The difference is that those efforts are not about disarmament, but about making sure weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. What doesn’t seem to be understood is that global disarmament solves this problem: no nuclear weapons anywhere means no nuclear weapons in the wrong hands.
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