We live in a world full of alternatives and options. We have alternative music, alternative finance in the form of microcredit and examples of alternative lifestyles ranging from freegans all the way to new spiritual practices. So if you are national leader with a couple billion dollars in your sovereign wealth fund, what defense alternatives can you make to avoid becoming a nuclear pariah?

For many, opting out of the nuclear club means getting a bigger army, air force, or navy. Countries such as Turkey and Egypt have increased their air and land forces, yet it is undeniable that these institutions have lead to a militarization of these societies and unstable concentrations of power. Countries such as South Korea have looked toward the ocean and created naval forces. Developing a navy is a smart endeavor if you are a trading nation, but the idea of opening new markets or establishing new bases through naval force has not been an effective tactic since the 1800s. Finally there is a fourth path nations can take. Countries that are unable or unwilling to make nuclear weapons sometimes opt for the “poor man’s bomb.” Chemical and biological weapons can make countries feel safer, but they can also attract sanctions.

A novel idea for a nuclear weapon alternative is to invest in a national media service. Tiny Qatar is definitely ahead in this field. With Al Jazeera, Qatar is able to promote its national interest, employ citizens in a high-tech field and shape global opinion. To some extent, Al Jazeera’s Qatari staff can be seen almost as a defense reserve. As conflict increasingly moves to a “war amongst people model” as opposed to a “war between states model,” communication skills and the ability to frame a scenario becomes invaluable. Furthermore, the workload shouldered by Al Jazeera’s staff would also provide Qatar with highly-skilled individuals if conflict was to occur. It is important to remember that many of the requirements of a successful media service dovetail with modern, high-tech military needs. For example, Al Jazeera staff must understand satellite communication, cyber security and multi-variable logistics networks. 

In an actionable sense, Al Jazeera also raises the clout of Qatar. Since Al Jazeera is seen by millions of global viewers, its programming inevitably impacts the world of politics. During the 2011 Egyptian revolution, Al Jazeera offered to suspend transmission to Egypt if Hosni Mubarak agreed to “deliver a lasting settlement for the Palestinians.” Furthermore, Qatar is able to leverage Al Jazeera to improve relations. Since 2009, Al Jazeera has promoted the US and the goals of the Obama administration. This decision coincided with improved US-Qatari relations vis-a-vis Iran in addition to a shifting of President Obama’s rhetoric pertaining to the role of the US in the Middle East. Al Jazeera is also used to promote Saudi-Qatari ties. Qatar and Saudi Arabia hit a low point with Qatar criticizing the Saudi royal family and the Saudi intervention in Bahrain. However, since 2009 Qatar has used favorable coverage of the Saudi royal family to mend fences.   

Developing a national media service is an attractive alternative to nuclear weapons. Nations that take this route do not have to worry about drastically altering their security environment or getting the short end of crippling sanctions. Innovative security solutions such as these enrich national workforces and provide new routes to pursue the national interest. 


Drew Martin
Fellow

Missile defense has returned to news with developments in both Israel and the US. In Israel, The BBC has reported that the vaunted Israeli “Iron Dome” system seems to have underperformed in  the November 2012 Israel-Hamas conflict.  During the conflict, “Iron Dome” was used to shield Israeli population centers from Palestinian rockets. The system works through a combination of radar and fire control capabilities. After an enemy rocket is launched, a radar ground station tracks the object and directs an interceptor missile. In addition to the news on “Iron Dome” the second announcement dealt with the deployment of additional anti-ballistic missile in Alaska and California. According to the Obama administration this action was prompted by North Korean bellicosity related to its nuclear program and ongoing disputes with the South.

Interwoven into the these two narratives are the dual facets of missile defense. On the one hand, anti-missile systems are lauded, and often praised as shields in a world full of swords. On the other, is the fact that missile defense weapons don’t work and often perpetuate ongoing problems. “Iron Dome” is a clear example of this dichotomy. During the November 2012 Gaza-Israel conflict “Iron Dome” was touted as a the linchpin of a successful Israeli strategy. Israeli representatives even claimed that “Iron Dome” had an 85% efficacy. Theoretically, the anti-missile system allowed Israel to protect its population centers and thereby avoid an embarrassing ground invasion to neutralize the rocket threat.

In practice however, it is now known that “Iron Dome” is much less effective than previously thought. According MIT’s Theodore Postol, the interception rate of “Iron Dome” is much closer to 5-10%. Israel is not alone in this regard. The US has inflated the accuracy of its missile defense systems in the past. Praised as an effective defensive measure in the Gulf War, the “Patriot” anti-missile system has since demonstrated that it is highly ineffective in a missile defense role. Furthermore, US research has not fielded a single missile defense system that would be viable in combat situations.

If the math of missile defense is considered holistically, there is no way of seeing a clear resolution to the gap in capabilities, desired outcomes and on-the-ground realities. This is the fallacy of missile defense. While “Iron Dome” represents this fact in a conventional setting, the impotence of missile defense is just as glaring in the nuclear realm. For over 60 years, nations have attempted to shield their societies from the weapons of others. Whether it is Soviet tests at Sary Shagan or Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars,” missile defense regimes often start with great fanfare and eventually end in obscure obsolescence.

There are two reasons for this. First, it is highly unlikely that missile defense will ever be able to catch up with offensive weapons. In the case of “Iron Dome” Israeli planners were forced to contend with a situation that included one warhead per enemy rocket. Yet with more advanced opponents, the number of rockets and the number of warheads they carry can increased.  For nuclear weapons, a MIRV’d (multiple independent re-entry vehicle) rocket can send warheads to numerous locations to thereby making interception more difficult.

A second factor is deception. Many missiles, including those carrying nuclear payloads, use relatively inexpensive decoy systems. These devices mimic actual parts of a given missile during the different stages of its trajectory. In intercontinental ballistic missiles, decoys are often made of mylar (the same material used for birthday party balloons) and inflate in a manner that emulates the heat and radar signature of a nuclear warhead. Another decoy method is to intentionally create fragmentation thereby overwhelming a radar’s or sensor’s ability to track a given object. If modern anti-missile systems have a difficult time intercepting a single missile, it is unreasonable to expect them to simultaneously contend with both warheads and decoys.

As the history of missile defense has shown, leaders and pundits have consistently boasted about the efficacy of these systems. In the US there is even a Missile Defense Agency. The problem with this perspective is that it continues the myth that missile defense is a viable option. Though missile defense is often presented as a defensive measure, this belief actually contributes to the creation of more offensive weapons thereby making the world more dangerous. Not only does missile defense provide other states with the rationale to increase or enhance their offensive weaponry, it permits national leaders to score big with national constituencies by acting strong on national security.


Drew Martin
Fellow 

Recently, news has pointed to an eventual dialogue between the US and Iran regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Such news has circulated since 2008 and it is likely that future talks, whether public or private, will have moments of bothprogress and deadlock. Unlike before, there are some reasons to feel optimistic. First, President Obama has won a second term. In his first term, Obama outlined his vision for a nuclear free world. Furthermore, during his first inauguration address he indirectly referenced Iran while signaling his desire to negotiate. Now that Obama has achieved a second term, members of his administration have further warmed to the idea of nuclear reduction and this mindset should assist international efforts. In addition during the 2012 election, rumors circulated that the US and Iran were already talking. Although these rumors were denied, most likely due to both US and Iranian domestic necessities, it is plausible that they represent early back-channel communication. Third, Iran's geopolitical outlook has changed dramatically. The most recent round of sanctions dramatically reduced the value of Iranian currency, impacting both Iranian consumers and government revenues. Iran has also lost regional prestige due to the Arab Spring. Its primary Arab ally, Syria, is embroiled in a regionally divisive civil war and non-state allies like Hezbollah must contend with a fractious domestic environment.

Like any news, especially pertaining to arms control, we should keep our fingers crossed and hope for a potential breakthrough. Assuming that talks go forward, and I think they will, I believe that the US and Iran should begin with areas of mutual gain. This should include nuclear safety vis-a-vis non-state actors. Both the US and Iran face numerous threats from terrorist. More so, they share a common enemy in al Qaeda and other Sunni groups. Al Qaeda attacked the US multiple times in the 1990s, which culminated in the 9/11 attacks. Iran was also attacked by al Qaeda in 1998, 2007 and 2009. This shared concern can form the foundation of a US-Iranian détente. There are many ways that both countries can work to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. The US should propose sharing nuclear detection technology with Iran. Air “sniffers” which can detect nuclear particles should be leased or given to Iranian port and airport authorities. Though focused on terrorists, these detectors would also increase trust. If genuinely shared, detectors would prove to the US that Iran is not using its transport infrastructure to share nuclear materials. While I doubt future negotiations will result in an Obama in Iran moment (or dare I say a future Hillary in Iran moment!), there are tangible solutions to the current impasse. Both sides have an opportunity to unclench their fist and grab the low hanging fruit.    

Drew Martin
Fellow

Next month will mark the 10th anniversary (March 20, 2003 - March 20, 2013) of the Iraq War. Initially started as preventative war to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq War quickly metastasized to a combined counter-terror and counter-insurgency campaign that rivaled only the Afghanistan War in duration. Ten years on, there is still much that can be gleaned from reviewing the nature, motivations and consequences of the war. Below, I have provided an outline of some of the most glaring, but also some of the more nuanced lessons of non-proliferation in the wake of the Iraq War. 

1) Forcible Disarmament is Easier on Paper:

In the winter of 2002 the plan for the upcoming Iraq war involved a combination of US technical know-how, the resolve of the US population and a keen sense that the Iraqi population would accept the US and its allies as benevolent partners. When the US and its allies crossed from Kuwait into Iraq on March 20, 2003 this facade quickly faded. In forcibly disarming Iraq, the US-led coalition had to contend with a fractured and fratricidal society. Even if the objectives were limited to non-proliferation efforts such as seizing materials like uranium, destroying or dismantling weapons facilities, and detaining skilled individuals with marketable weapons expertise, the US and its allies would still have to occupy a country of 31 million people in one of the roughest neighborhoods of the world. Furthermore, as my colleague Jon Miller pointed out, the 1999 Desert Crossing war games already confirmed that an occupying mission would be a mess. This fact should be kept in mind especially as the US gaze is now focused on Syria and Iran. 

2) Dictators Lie, Democrats Lie:

And no, I don’t mean the party that has the donkey. Instead, we should focus on how neither of the two major leaders of the Iraq War told the truth. George Bush was clear in positing that the war was a preventative measure designed to remove the threat of Iraqi WMD, which never materialized. Ironically, the one person who could assuage this fear, Saddam Hussein, failed to provide evidence until it was too late. After his capture, Hussein explained to the FBI that he was more afraid of Iran than the US and he knew that UN inspectors would reveal his weaknesses, especially that he had slowly dismantled his WMD programs. The fact that leaders have agendas is well known. However, in 2013, there is much more information available than there was 10 years ago. On the non-proliferation front, we can buy or rent satellite imagery to see what is actually happening on the ground. If Iran constructs a new facility or North Korea digs another tunnel we can know in near real-time. Furthermore, as the cyber realm becomes more transparent, we can see into the bureaucratic thought processes of individual governments. As Wikileaks and the hacking of the Syrian presidential emails have shown, privileged government communication is more accessible today. Consider how history may have changed if we had Iraqi emails circa 2002.   

3) The Iraq War Did Not Start the Second Nuclear Age:

Many commentators have argued that the Iraq War lead to further nuclear proliferation since it highlighted the risks that proliferating countries must face before they reach breakout capacity. Under this argument countries such as North Korea and Iran redoubled their efforts to get the bomb after seeing what happened to Saddam Hussein and Iraq. While it’s true that North Korea obtained nuclear weapons in 2006, 3 years after the start of the Iraq War, its program, like the weapons programs of Pakistan, Iran, Libya, and also Iraq, can be traced to previous decades. This second nuclear age differs from the previous global nuclear arrangement through its participation of Asian states who tend to be nationalistic and underdeveloped. Paul Bracken, who has written extensively on the topic, pinpoints a possible start of the 2nd nuclear age with the 1974 Indian nuclear test. The Iraq War was a symptom of the second nuclear age; it didn’t cause it. 

Drew Martin
Fellow

I recently stumbled across an Atlantic story titled “No, Anonymous Doesn’t Have Access to U.S. Warheads.” The piece broached last week’s Anonymous attacks on the United States Sentencing Commission’s website and claims made by the hacker group. Anonymous (the folks with the Guy Fawkes masks) hacked the website over the suicide of internet activist Aaron Swartz and referred to the sensitive material that they obtained as “warheads.” Clarifying Anonymous’ phrasing, the Atlantic reminded readers, quite jokingly, not to set their clocks closer to midnight.  

That said, I think this piece raises the issue of cyber security in the modern nuclear age. Though Anonymous does not have access to US nuclear information or technology, it is not out of the realm of possibility for a motivated, well funded group to have this ability. This is especially true in light of the US-Israeli Stuxnet virus that caused Iranian centrifuges to spin themselves to destruction. Cyber safety and security are a big concern, yet, like Anonymous’ lack of interest in the actual US warheads, the problems relating to cyber activity are much more acute when looking outside the US. 

Getting back to Iran, a robust cyber infrastructure pertains to more than just weaponry and can also affect the economy and the environment. Recently there was rumor that the nuclear plant at Isfahan was leaking radiation. If this actually happened, either due to faulty programming or a cyber attack, the residents living nearby would be forced to flee and the local water and soil systems would be greatly affected. Considering that many emerging nuclear states build nuclear infrastructure near population centers (i.e. Saddam Hussein ordered the construction of nuclear research facilities in Baghdad, especially under mosques and hospitals), a programming failure would also drain the economic vitality of cities. Furthermore, accidents relating to military to nuclear weapon programs are nothing new. In 1957 a level 6 disaster (on the International Nuclear Event Scale, both the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi disasters are level 7s) occurred at the Mayak weapons facility in the Soviet Union. That same year, a fire occurred at the Windscale Piles nuclear weapons facility in the UK, creating a level 5 disaster. Fast-forwarding a bit to 1962, the Béryl incident irradiated over 100 French troops and the current French defense minister at the time. 

Though these events happened in the past, new members to the nuclear club have ineffective cyber security or safety to avoid accidents. Anonymous may not have the “warheads,” but the problem of safety and digitization should be addressed. In between weapon freezes and reductions, arms control should tackle its cyber gap.  


Drew Martin
Fellow

I am currently working on an opus discussing counterproliferation in the 2nd nuclear age. In the course of my research I have stumbled over some interesting facts, some new discoveries and also some really wonky phrases, one of which happens to be “questionable doctrine”. Found in a research piece titled Deterrence and Defense in “The Second Nuclear Age”, this phrase attempts to illustrate the confusion of the 2nd nuclear age. In any other context “questionable doctrine” may refer to using the wrong fork at dinner, wearing bright colors to a sombre event or accidentally calling a female sir. And though not as funny, it is the potential for mistakes, blunders, short-sighted decisions and general awkwardness that makes 2nd age nuclear doctrine so “questionable”. 

In the 2nd nuclear age countries have struggled to define their relationships with atomic weapons. This is in contrast with the first nuclear age in which most nuclear aspirants strove for large strategic arsenals with built-in redundancy in order to avoid reliance on first-use strikes. In the second nuclear age, most weapon states find it hard to make up their mind in what weapons they want and how they wish to use them. Take for example North Korea. The poor nation in Northeast Asia often starts and stops its program depending on the concessions it receives from the outside world. What is more, it has never stated if, how or when it would use its weapons. In addition, North Korea has failed to miniaturize its weapons, yet it pursues a rocket/ missile program. Lastly, North Korea’s decision to share its nuclear expertise may qualify as a doctrine, but it is still difficult to determine. Regardless whether you agree or disagree (although most people disagree) with North Korea’s choices, it is clear that North Korea has no solid doctrine and that its actions only add to confusion. 

“Questionable” actions such as these are not isolated to North Korea, but are a defining feature of the 2nd nuclear age. In the United States the Bush administration wanted to create smaller nuclear weapons that could be used on the battlefield against bunkers and non-conventional weapons, while the Obama administration has a stated goal of a nuclear free world. In Southeast Asia, India recently changed its nuclear position from “no first use” to “no first use against non-nuclear weapons states” and both India and Pakistan have reiterated the slogans of minimal deterrence while maximizing their arsenals. Flip-flopping and confusion have become the norm and are increasing the risks associated with nuclear weapons. In the 2nd nuclear age, states that attempt to counter threats with more weapons or “novel” doctrines will only create suspicion and stretch their command and control resources to their limits. 


Drew Martin
Fellow